Robust 3D-Trajectory and Time Switching Optimization for Dual-UAV-Enabled Secure Communications by Wang, Wei et al.
This is a repository copy of Robust 3D-Trajectory and Time Switching Optimization for 
Dual-UAV-Enabled Secure Communications.




Wang, Wei, Li, Xinrui, Wang, Rui et al. (4 more authors) (Accepted: 2021) Robust 3D-
Trajectory and Time Switching Optimization for Dual-UAV-Enabled Secure 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1
Robust 3D-Trajectory and Time Switching Optimization for
Dual-UAV-Enabled Secure Communications
Wei Wang, Member, IEEE, Xinrui Li, Rui Wang, Senior Member, IEEE,
Kanapathippillai Cumanan, Senior Member, IEEE, Wei Feng, Senior Member, IEEE,
Zhiguo Ding, Fellow, IEEE, and Octavia A. Dobre, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This paper investigates a dual-unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV)-enabled secure communication system, in which,
a UAV moves around to send confidential messages to a mobile
user while another cooperative UAV transmits artificial noise
signals to confuse malicious eavesdroppers. Both UAVs have
energy constraints and the location information of eavesdroppers
is imperfect. We consider a worst-case secrecy rate maximization
problem of the mobile user over all time slots. This optimization
problem is solved by jointly designing the three-dimensional
(3D) trajectory of UAVs and the time allocation (recharging
and service or jamming) under practical constraints including
maximum UAV speed, UAV collision avoidance, UAV positioning
error, and UAV energy harvesting. Specifically, we adopt a more
practical UAV-ground channel model with both large-scale and
small-scale fading components. Due to the non-convex feasible
region constructed by the complicated constraints, directly find-
ing the optimal solution of the original problem is intractable. To
address this issue, we decouple the original optimization problem
into three subproblems and develop an iterative algorithm to
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find its suboptimal solution by using the block coordinate
descent technique. To solve each subproblem, certain advanced
optimization tools, such as integer relaxation, S-procedure, and
successive convex approximation techniques, are utilized. Numer-
ical simulation results are provided to corroborate the theoretical
derivations and to evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm. Additionally, the numerical results assist to draw new
insights on the 3D UAV trajectory by comparing the performance
with conventional two-dimensional (2D) schemes.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) communi-
cations, robust 3D-trajectory design, physical layer security,
cooperative jamming, maritime communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNMANNED aerial vehicles (UAVs) have attracted sig-nificant attention in recent years due to their various
potential applications, such as information broadcasting, re-
laying, and data collection [1]–[4]. This, in contrast to the
traditional terrestrial communications, is mainly attributed to
the more flexible deployment and agile mobility of UAVs,
as well as their line-of-sight (LoS) communication links with
the ground terminals at a moderate altitude [5]–[8]. Despite
the promising gains and benefits offered by UAVs, the open
nature of air-to-ground wireless channels makes the infor-
mation transfer more vulnerable and a challenging issue [9].
Hence, information security in UAV wireless communications
is extremely important and needs to be carefully addressed.
We note that conventional encryption techniques require
secret key generations, whose distributions and managements
may lead to security vulnerability in wireless systems. On
the contrary, physical layer security has recently drawn
significant attentions from different wireless communication
research communities because of its capability to realize
secure transmission by exploiting the inherent randomness
and dynamic characteristics of wireless channels [10]–[14].
Recently, different physical layer security techniques have
been proposed for providing information security in UAV-
assisted communication systems [9], [15]–[17]. Additionally,
the fully controllable mobility of UAVs can be exploited
to further enhance physical layer security via adjusting its
trajectory. This is due to the fact that the UAV can fly
close to the legitimate ground node and move away from
the eavesdroppers to avoid information interception. Thus,
UAV trajectory design has become an important research
topic for physical layer security provisioning. For example,
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a secrecy rate maximization problem for an UAV-assisted
communication system was studied in [18], in which a new
trajectory design scheme was proposed by using the mobility
of UAV. Physical layer security techniques were extended to
both downlink and uplink of an UAV-ground communication
system in [19], where the average secrecy rate was maximized
by jointly optimizing the trajectory and transmit power of
UAV. In [20], a utility optimization problem was considered
to maximize the average secrecy rate in UAV-assisted mobile
jamming system by jointly designing the UAV’s trajectory
and jamming power. An average secrecy rate maximization
problem for an UAV-enabled secure communication system
was studied in [21], where a joint design of UAV trajectory,
transmit power levels and power splitting ratios was proposed.
Moreover, a UAV-assisted secure system in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers was investigated in [22], where the
secrecy rate was maximized by jointly optimizing the trajec-
tory and transmit power of the UAV. However, the authors in
[18]–[22] assumed that the locations of eavesdroppers were
perfectly known, which is not a realistic assumption, and
thus, the results are not applicable to practical scenarios. To
deal with this issue, a secure UAV communication system
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers was considered in
[23], where a joint robust trajectory design and power control
scheme was proposed to maximize the average worst-case
secrecy rate.
However, the aforementioned works only considered a
single UAV-assisted secure communication system [18]–[23],
which may not achieve a high-level security performance.
This is because it is generally difficult for an UAV-mounted
base station to keep far away from all the eavesdroppers
with imperfect knowledge of their locations, when it trans-
mits confidential information to the legitimate receiver. Thus,
a cooperative UAV jammer is highly appealing to further
improve the quality of secured transmission [24]–[26]. In
[24], a dual-UAV enabled secure communication system with
multiple eavesdroppers was investigated, where one UAV was
assumed to be a mobile base station while the other UAV was
considered as a jammer to assist the secure communications
of desired users. In [25], the authors considered an UAV-aided
secure communication system with a cooperative jamming
UAV, where the minimum secrecy rate was maximized by
jointly optimizing the trajectory and transmit power of the
UAVs as well as the user scheduling. Further, a max-min
secrecy rate optimization problem for a dual-UAV enabled
secure communication system was studied in [26], in which
a joint design of UAV trajectory and transmit power was
proposed. However, the authors in [24]–[26] assumed that
perfect knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ locations is available
for trajectory design, which is an impractical assumption. In
addition, the aforementioned works, e.g., [18]–[26], assumed
that the UAV flies at a fixed altitude and thus only the two-
dimensional (2D) UAV trajectory design was considered. In
fact, due to fully controllable three-dimensional (3D) mobility,
UAVs provide more degrees of freedom to either cruise
horizontally or ascend/descend vertically to a desired location,
depending on the requirements of communication security.
Therefore, designing the 3D trajectory of dual-UAV in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers with imperfect locations
is of paramount importance to improve the overall secrecy
performance.
Recently, UAV’s 3D trajectory design has drawn signif-
icant research interests. For instance, in [27], the authors
investigated a UAV-enabled wireless sensor network, where
the average data collection rate from all sensor nodes was
maximized by jointly optimizing the UAV’s 3D trajectory
and communication scheduling. In [28], a multicarrier solar-
powered UAV communication system was considered, where
the system sum throughput was maximized by jointly de-
signing the 3D aerial trajectory and the wireless resource
allocation over a given time period. A max-min average rate
optimization problem for an energy-constrained UAV-assisted
downlink cellular network was studied in [29], in which a joint
design of resource allocation and 3D trajectory was proposed.
In [30], the authors considered a rotary-wing UAV-enabled
wireless power transfer system, where the harvested energy
at all energy receivers was maximized by jointly optimizing
the UAV’s 3D trajectory, beam pattern and charging time.
Furthermore, in [31], the authors investigated a UAV-assisted
cognitive communication network, where the average rate of
the secondary receivers was maximized by jointly optimizing
the UAV’s 3D trajectory and power allocation. Despite the
research efforts devoted to the UAV’s 3D trajectory design,
the existing designs, e.g., [27]–[31], may not be applicable for
the use-cases where information security is utmost important
in UAV communication systems. It is worth noting that there
have been some initial attempts to address the security issues
of UAV-assisted communication systems by designing the 3D
trajectory. For example, in [32], the authors investigated a
secure UAV communication system in the presence of multiple
ground nodes and colluding eavesdroppers, where the average
secrecy rate was maximized by jointly optimizing the UAV’s
3D trajectory and transmit power allocation. However, it was
assumed that the locations of eavesdroppers were perfectly
known, which is impractical. Furthermore, the works in [27]–
[32] only considered the case of a single UAV, which does not
provide much degrees of freedom to achieve a better physical
layer security performance.
Motivated by the aforementioned aspects, we consider
a dual-UAV-assisted secure communication system in this
paper, where a UAV base station (UAV-S) intends to send
confidential messages to the legitimate mobile user with the
help of a cooperative UAV jammer (UAV-J) in the pres-
ence of multiple eavesdroppers. In particular, the mobility
of both UAVs and user are taken into account. Furthermore,
we consider a practical scenario where the eavesdropper’s
locations are not perfectly known and the onboard energy
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TABLE I
LIST OF FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES.
Symbol Description
T Flight period of UAVs
dt Length of each time slot
α[n] Time switching (TS) ratio
qa[n] Horizontal location of node a
ha[n] Vertical location of node a
dmin Minimum security distance of UAVs
δu Positioning error at a reference distance
Θu Positioning error threshold of UAVs
Ek Continuous set of estimation errors
∆Qk Radius of maximum estimation error
gab[n] Large-scale channel coefficient between a and b
h̃ab[n] Small-scale fading coefficient between a and b
ρ0 Channel power gain at a reference distance
dab[n] Distance between a and b
V maxa Maximum speed of node a
K[n] Rician factor
η Energy conversion efficiency
ε Interference cancellation factor
κ Euler constant
Pa[n] Transmit power of node a
Rd[n] Achievable rate at the mobile user
Rek [n] Achievable rate at the eavesdroppers
Rlb
d
[n] Lower bound of Rd[n]
Rubek [n] Upper bound of Rek [n]
Eu Minimum EH requirement
Γjd Upper bound of small-scale fading between UAV-J and D
Γje Lower bound of small-scale fading between UAV-J and Ek
σ2
{d,e}
Variance of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
RWCSR Average worst-case secrecy rate
supply of UAVs is limited.1 Different from most previous
works which considered the free space path loss model to
simplify the analysis, we adopt a more practical UAV-ground
channel model that includes both large-scale and small-scale
fading components. Our objective is to maximize the worst-
case secrecy rate among all time slots by jointly designing
the UAVs 3D trajectory and time switching (TS) (recharging
and service or jamming) under the UAV’s mobility, anti-
collision, positioning and energy harvesting (EH) constraints.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the robust joint design
for dual-UAV-assisted secure communications has not been
reported in the literature, and our contributions towards the
joint design are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a model for a dual-UAV-assisted secure
communication system and formulate an optimization problem
to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate of the mobile user by
taking into account the mobility of both UAVs and mobile
user. Additionally, we adopt a more practical UAV-ground
channel model with both large-scale and small-scale fading
components.
2) Then, we study the joint 3D trajectory and TS design
for solving the formulated optimization problem. In order
to deal with the non-convexity issue, we decompose the
original optimization problem into three subproblems and
utilize integer relaxation, S-procedure, and successive convex
1These system settings can occur in emergency communications or ocean
scenarios, where the conventional terrestrial base stations are destroyed or
do not exist, and then, a mobile aerial base station should be employed to
provide the necessary communication infrastructure without the support from
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Fig. 1. Illumination of an energy-constrained dual-UAV-assisted secure
communication system:a maritime example.
approximation (SCA) techniques to convert the challenging
subproblems into more tractable forms.
3) Next, we develop an iterative optimization algorithm
to alternately solve the equivalently converted subproblems
by using the block coordinate descent (BCD) method, and
then, a suboptimal solution of the original problem is obtained.
In each iteration, we derive numerical solutions of the TS
ratio, UAV-S and UAV-J trajectories, which provide important
insights to incorporate in the efficient system design.
4) Finally, we analyze the convergence and the com-
plexity of the proposed algorithm, and evaluate the system
performance through numerical simulations. Furthermore, we
show that for the scenario of multiple eavesdroppers and
the mobile user, the proposed 3D dual-UAV trajectory can
realize a significant secrecy rate gain over the conventional
2D trajectory designs in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model and the problem formulation are presented
in Section II, whereas a three-step alternating algorithm is
developed in Section III to yield a suboptimal solution for the
original optimization problem. Section IV presents simulation
results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed design,
and finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Notations: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters denote
vectors and matrices, respectively. For a vector a, a† and
||a|| represents its transpose and Euclidean norm, respectively.
A ≽ 0 indicates that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. | · |
and E(·) denote the absolute value and statistical expectation,
respectively. The distribution of a circular symmetric complex
Gaussian vector with mean vector x and covariance matrix
Σ is denoted by CN (x,Σ). The notation [m]+ stands for
max(0,m). A list of variables used in this work is provided
in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a dual-UAV-assisted secure maritime commu-
nication system as shown in Fig. 1, where a UAV-S intends
to transmit confidential information to the legitimate mobile
user (a ship in the maritime example) D while another UAV-J
cooperatively transmits artificial noise (AN) signals to con-
fuse multiple independent eavesdroppers {E1, E2, · · · , Ek}.
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In practice, the UAVs are connected to shore-based base
stations or satellites with wireless backhauls to obtain data
and instructions [24]. In this UAV network, it is assumed that
UAVs, the mobile user, and all eavesdroppers are equipped
with a single antenna [33], [34]. Furthermore, since the UAVs
are powered by the energy-limited onboard battery which
needs to harvest energy from surrounding environments [28],
[35]–[38], we assume that the UAV-S and UAV-J employ the
TS protocol to periodically harvest energy from the power-
supply D for rendering communication services and cooper-
ative jamming2. We consider a particular UAVs flight period
with duration T in second (s), which is discretized into N time
slots with equal duration dt = T/N , where N , {1, · · · , N}
denotes the set of slots. Note that the locations of the UAVs
can be assumed approximately the same during each time slot
when dt is chosen sufficiently small, as presented in [19],
[23], [25], [27]–[29]. Furthermore, let α[n] denote the TS
ratio at time slot n ∈ N , i.e., α[n] = 0 and α[n] = 1
represents UAVs recharging period and service or jamming
period, respectively. Without loss of generality, we consider
a 3D cartesian coordinate system, in which the UAVs exploit
the fully-controllable mobility to change their 3D locations
over time, in order to improve the quality of secrecy commu-
nications. The coordinate of the mobile user can be expressed
as (qd[n], 0), where qd[n] = (xd[n], yd[n]) denotes the hori-
zontal coordinate in time slot n. The coordinates (qek [n], 0),
qek [n] = (xk[n], yk[n]), represent the exact location of the
k-th eavesdropper, Ek, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, which is not avail-
able at the legitimate system. However, we assume that the
UAVs have the capability to estimate the locations of Ek, i.e.,
(xek [n], yek [n], 0) [23], [38]. Furthermore, the time-varying
3D position of dual-UAV can be expressed as (qu[n], hu[n]),
u ∈ {s, j}, where qu[n] = (xu[n], yu[n]) and hu[n] denote
the UAV’s horizontal and vertical (or altitude) entries of
the 3D coordinate system, respectively. Additionally, suppose
that qu[0] = (xu[0], yu[0]) and qu[N ] = (xu[N ], yu[N ])
denote the UAV’s pre-determined initial and final horizontal
locations, and hu[0] and hu[N ] denote the corresponding al-
titudes, respectively. Based on these coordinates, the mobility
constraints of the UAVs can be expressed as
||qu[n]− qu[n− 1]|| ≤ V maxu,h dt, (1a)
|hu[n]− hu[n− 1]| ≤ V maxu,v dt, ∀n, (1b)
where V maxu,h and V
max
u,v , u ∈ {s, j}, denote the maximum
horizontal and vertical speed of UAVs, respectively. Further-
more, to avoid collision between the UAV-S and UAV-J, we
impose the following minimum security distance constraint:
√
||qs[n]− qj[n]||2 + |hs[n]− hj [n]|2 ≥ dmin, ∀n (2)
2Since the propulsion energy consumption of the UAV is much larger than
that of the wireless transmission in practice, we assume that the onboard
battery supplies for the flight control of UAVs while the harvested energy
accounts only for its information transmission and cooperative jamming, as
commonly adopted in the literature [36]–[38]
where dmin is the minimum anti-collision safe distance. Since
the UAVs need to correct the positioning error to successfully
arrive at the final location in practical scenarios [39], [40], the
accumulated errors on the horizontal and vertical directions
need to meet the following constraints:
N∑
n=1
δu||qu[n]− qu[n− 1]|| ≤ Θu,h, (3a)
N∑
n=1
δu|hu[n]− hu[n− 1]| ≤ Θu,v, ∀n (3b)
where δu, u ∈ {s, j}, denotes the positioning error at a
reference distance of 1 m, and Θu,h and Θu,v represent the
horizontal and vertical positioning error thresholds of UAVs,
respectively.
As the locations of the eavesdroppers are imperfectly known
at the UAVs, the relationships between the actual and the
estimated x, y coordinates of Ek can be respectively defined
as
xk[n] = xek [n] + ∆xk[n], (4a)
yk[n] = yek [n] + ∆yk[n], (4b)
where ∆xk[n] and ∆yk[n] denote the estimation errors. These
errors are assumed to be bounded within a circle and satisfy
the following constraint [23], [38]:
(∆xk[n],∆yk[n]) ∈ Ek
, {(∆xk[n],∆yk[n])|∆x2k[n] + ∆y2k[n] ≤ ∆Q2k},
(5)
where Ek represents a continuous set of possible errors and
∆Q2k denotes the magnitude square of the maximum estima-
tion error. Additionally, it is assumed that the mobile user has
a fixed trajectory constraints, which can be defined as3
xd[n] = xd[n−1], yd[n] = yd[n−1]+V maxd dt, ∀n ∈ N , (6)
where V maxd represents the maximum speed of the mobile
user.
In addition to these constraints, different from most pre-
vious works which used the free space path loss model to
simplify the analysis, a typical UAV-ocean channel model with
both large-scale and small-scale fading is employed [33], [34].
Thus, at time slot n, the channel power gains from UAVs to
































3This is typical for maritime navigations [33], [34], where all ships have
fixed routes to avoid collision. The investigation of multiple mobile users
with arbitrary trajectories is an interesting topic for future work.
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where {gud[n], guek [n]} and {h̃ud[n], h̃uek [n]} represent
the large-scale and small-scale fading coefficients between
UAVs and D as well as Ek, respectively. The symbol
ρ0 denotes the channel power gain at a reference dis-
tance of 1 m [18]–[20], [22]–[26], [29], [31], [32], and
dud[n] =
√
||qu[n]− qd[n]||2 + h2u[n] and duek [n] =√
||qu[n]− qek [n]||2 + h2u[n], u ∈ {s, j}, represent the dis-
tances between UAVs-to-D and UAVs-to-Ek at slot n ∈ N ,
respectively. The symbols {gud, guek} ∈ CN (0, 1) and K[n]
defines the Rician factor that corresponds to the ratio between
the LoS power and the scattering power4. Since the UAVs
are powered by an energy-limited onboard battery, it is as-
sumed that the UAVs need to harvest energy for rendering
communication services or cooperative jamming. In general,
the harvested energy is a nonlinear function with respect
to the received radio frequency power [41], [42]. However,
there is no generic EH model which can captures all practical
scenarios [43]. Therefore, for simplicity, we consider a linear
EH model which has been commonly adopted in the literature
[22], [28], [29], [38]. Due to gud ∈ CN (0, 1), the harvested










where Pd[n] denotes the transmit power of the mobile user
and η ∈ (0, 1] represents the energy conversion efficiency.
Under the above setting, at time slot n ∈ N , the signal-
to-interference plus-noise ratio (SINR) and the achievable





















where Ps[n] and Pj [n] represent the transmit power by the
UAV-S and UAV-J, respectively. The symbols ε and κ denote
the interference cancellation factor and the Euler constant,
respectively. The symbol σ2d represents the variance of the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the mobile user, and
Γjd denotes the upper bound of small-scale fading between
UAV-J and D, and Rlbd [n] represents the lower bound of Rd[n].
Similarly, the SINR and the achievable average rate of Ek can
be expressed respectively as
SINRek [n] =
Ps[n]hsek [n]
σ2e + Pj [n]hjek [n]
, (11)
4In general, K[n] is the function of the elevation angle between the UAVs
and ground nodes, but it is assumed constant in the current work for tractable

















where σ2e represents the variance of the AWGN at the k-th
eavesdropper, and Γje denotes the lower bound of small-scale




upper bound of Rek [n].
Our objective is to maximize the average worst-case secrecy
rate (RWCSR) among all time slots by jointly designing the
dual-UAV 3D trajectory, {qu[n], hu[n]}, u ∈ {s, j}, and TS
ratio {α[n]}, ∀n, subject to the UAV’s mobility, anti-collision,
















s.t. C1 : ||qu[n]− qu[n− 1]|| ≤ V maxu,h dt, u ∈ {s, j}, ∀n,
C2 : |hu[n]− hu[n− 1]| ≤ V maxu,v dt, u ∈ {s, j}, ∀n,
C3 :
√












(1− α[n])ηPd[n]gud[n] ≥ Eu, u ∈ {s, j}, ∀n,
C7 : hmin ≤ hu[n] ≤ hmax, u ∈ {s, j}, ∀n,
C8 : α[n] = {0, 1}, ∀n,
(13)
where the constraints C1 and C2 refer to the UAV’s mobility
constraints and constraint C3 is the security distance constraint
between the UAV-S and UAV-J. The constraints C4 and
C5 represent the horizontal and vertical positioning error
constraint of the UAVs, respectively. Eu in constraint C6
denotes the minimum EH requirement of the UAVs. hmin and
hmax represent the minimum and maximum allowed UAVs
flight altitudes, respectively.
Since the problem defined in (13) consists of binary discrete
variables (α[n]) and highly nonlinear objective function (both




the optimization variables {qu[n], hu[n]}); it is challenging to
obtain the global optimal solution. Furthermore, the imperfect
locations of the eavesdroppers (∆xk[n], ∆yk[n]) impose semi-
infinite number of constraints, which make the optimization
problem mathematically more intractable. In the following
section, we propose a computationally efficient iterative al-
6
gorithm to yield a feasible solution to the problem defined in
(13).
III. PROPOSED ITERATIVE ALGORITHM
In this section, we resort to the BCD technique through
decomposing problem (13) into three subproblems to obtain
a suboptimal solution, i.e., alternately optimizing different
groups of the TS ratio α[n], UAV-S trajectory {qs[n], hs[n]},
and UAV-J trajectory {qj[n], hj [n]} while the rest of the
variables are fixed.
A. Optimization of the TS ratio α[n]
For given UAV-S and UAV-J 3D trajectories {qu[n], hu[n]},
u ∈ {s, j}, by relaxing the binary variables in C8 into
continuous variables [27], [36], [44], [45], the problem defined











A1[n]α[n] ≤ b1, (14b)
N∑
n=1
A2[n]α[n] ≤ b2, (14c)
0 ≤ α[n] ≤ 1, ∀n, (14d)
where



























The problem defined in (14) is challenging to be directly
solved due to the estimation errors (∆xk[n], ∆yk[n]) con-
straints in (15a). Thus, we first define an upper bound for the









































and then, by substituting (5) and (7) into (17), the closed-form
solutions of g∗sek [n] and g
∗
jek






















As a result, the lower bound of M [n] in (15a) can be derived








s.t. (14b) ∼ (14d),
(20)


















. It is obvious that the reformulated prob-
lem in (20) is a standard linear programming problem, which
can be efficiently solved by existing standard optimization
techniques such as the simplex method [36], [46]. Thus, the




Remark: Note that the optimal TS ratio α[n] defined in
(21) is in general continuous, and can be reconstructed to the
binary solution {0, 1} using the binarization method in [45]
without compromising the optimality of the solution.
B. Optimization of the UAV-S Trajectory {qs[n], hs[n]}
With the fixed variables α[n] and {qj[n], hj [n]}, the prob-























σ2e + Pj [n]gje[n]Γje
)]
s.t. C1 ∼ C7, u = s.
(22)
Similar to the previous subproblem in (14), the above
problem is also challenging to optimally solve in polynomial
time due to its non-convex objective function. To deal with this
non-convexity issue, we first introduce a set of slack variables
t1 , [t1[1], t1[2], ..., t1[N ]]
† and t2 , [t2[1], t2[2], ..., t2[N ]]
†,




































+h2s[n]≥ t2[n], ∀n, k,
(23b)
(xs[n]−xd[n])2+(ys[n]−yd[n])2+h2s[n]−t1[n]≤0,∀n, (23c)
t2[n] ≥ h2min, ∀n, (23d)
C1 ∼ C7, u = s.
Note that the problem in (23) is still intractable due to the
non-convexity of (23a), (23b) and C6. Therefore, we can lever-
age the SCA technique to derive its convex approximation



















− gn(t1[n]− t1fea [n])
ln2(t21fea [n] + gnt1fea [n])
,
(24)
where t1fea [n] , [t1fea [1], t1fea [2], ..., t1fea [N ]]
† is the fea-
sible solution obtained at the (l − 1)th iteration. Then, by
introducing a slack variable ξk , [ξk[1], ξk[2], ..., ξk[N ]]
†,
based on the proof in Appendix A, (23b) can be equivalently
transformed to the following constraints:
Φ̃(xs[n], ys[n], hs[n], t2[n], ξk[n]) ≽ 0, ∀k, n, (25)
where Φ̃(xs[n], ys[n], hs[n], t2[n], ξk[n]) =

ξk[n] + 1 0 xek [n]− xs[n]
0 ξk[n] + 1 yek [n]− ys[n]
xek [n]− xs[n] yek [n]− ys[n] −∆Q2kξk[n] + c̃k[n]

,
and c̃k[n] = −x2sfea [n] + 2xsfea [n]xs[n] − 2xek [n]xs[n] +
x2ek [n]− y2sfea [n] + 2ysfea [n]ys[n]− 2yek [n]ys[n] + yek [n]2−
h2sfea [n] + 2hsfea [n]hs[n] − t2[n]. Similarly, the constraint
C6 in (23) can be equivalently rewritten as follows:
N∑
n=1










Based on (24), (25) and (26), the problem defined in (23)


















s.t. ξk[n] ≥ 0, ∀k, n,
C1 ∼ C5, C7, u = s,
(23c), (23d), (25), (26),
(27)
where Ξ , [ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξK ]. Note that the problem in (27) is
a standard semidefinite programming problem, which can be
optimally solved by using the interior-point methods [46].
C. Optimization of the UAV-J Trajectory {qj[n], hj [n]}
In this subsection, we solve the subproblem for optimizing
the 3D trajectory, {qj[n], hj [n]}, of UAV-J while the variables
α[n] and {qs[n], hs[n]} are fixed. Accordingly, the problem

























s.t. C1 ∼ C7, u = j.
(28)
By introducing new slack variables
m1 , [m1[1],m1[2], ...,m1[N ]]
† and m2 ,
[m2[1],m2[2], ...,m2[N ]]
†, and letting cn = e
−κPs[n]gsd[n]

































m1[n] ≥ h2min, ∀n, (29d)
C1 ∼ C7, u = j.
The reformulated problem in (29) remains still challenging to
directly solve due to the non-convexity of (29a), (29b), (29c)
and C6. Similar to the previous subproblem, we derive an
approximated solution to the problem in (29) by applying the
8
SCA technique. First, we define an upper bound for the term
log2
(












































2 [n] is the solution obtained for m2[n] at the (l −
1)th iteration.
Then, the constraint (29b) can be equivalently rewritten
based on the geometrical theory as [47]



































Finally, similar to (26) and (37), by using the first-order




j [n] and E
j
EH , the


















−B3[n](||(qj [n], hj [n])− (qd[n], 0)||2









As a result, by substituting (30)−(33) into (29), we rewrite
the problem in (29) into an equivalent form as
max

















s.t. C1 ∼ C5, C7, u = j,
(29d), (31) ∼ (33).
(34)
It is obvious that the above problem in (34) is a convex
optimization problem, which can be efficiently solved by
existing standard optimization solvers such as CVX [48].
TABLE II
THE PROPOSED ITERATIVE ALGORITHM.

















> γ and l < lmax do;
4: Let l = l+ 1, xsfea = x
l−1
s , ysfea = y
l−1
s , and hsfea = h
l−1
s ;















s) of (27) based on α









j) of (34) under given α
































In this subsection, based on the results presented in the
previous three subsections, we develop an iterative algorithm
for problem (13) by applying the BCD method. The proposed
algorithm is summarized in Table II and the convergence
analysis is given in Appendix B. Furthermore, the overall
computational complexity of the proposed algorithm in Table
II is as follows. In each iteration of Table II, the problems
defined in (20), (27) and (34) in steps 5, 6 and 7 are
sequentially optimized using the existing standard convex
solvers, and thus their individual complexity can be repre-
sented by O[N3.5log(1/ε0)], O[(5N + KN)3.5log(1/ε0)],
and O[(5N)3.5log(1/ε0)], respectively. The symbol ε0 is a
given tolerance [14], [27], [49], and K and N denote the
numbers of eavesdroppers and time slots, respectively. Thus,
the total computation complexity of the proposed algorithm
in Table II is O[Nite(5N +KN)3.5log(1/ε0)], where Nite is
the number of required iterations, which will be illustrated in
the following simulations.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides numerical simulation results to val-
idate the performance of the proposed scheme. The set-
ting of simulation is described in the following. The co-
ordinates of the initial and final locations of the UAVs
are set to be (xu[0], yu[0], hu[0]) = (−200, 0, 100) m
and (xu[N ], yu[N ], hu[N ]) = (200, 0, 100) m, respectively.
The mobile user’s (ship) initial horizontal coordinate is
(xd[n], yd[n]) = (0, 200) m. It is assumed that there exist
two eavesdroppers, whose estimated horizontal coordinates
are (xe1 [n], ye1 [n]) = (−100,−200) m and (xe2 [n], ye2 [n]) =
(100,−250) m, respectively. Furthermore, the channel power
gain ρ0 is 40 dBm [23], the Rician factor K[n] is 31.3,
and the upper and lower bounds of small-scale fading are
assumed to be Γjd = 1.35 and Γje = 0.65, respectively
[33]. Moreover, unless otherwise specified, η = 0.8 is the
energy conversion efficiency, σ2d = σ
2
e = −30 dBm are the
noise variances, ∆Q1 = ∆Q2 = 20 m are the estimation
errors radii, Pd[n] = 25 dBm is the transmit power at the
mobile user, Ps[n] = Pj [n] = 20 dBm are the transmit
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power at the UAV-S and UAV-J, respectively [24], [25].
Additionally, δs = δj = 0.01 are the positioning errors and
Θu,h = Θu,v = 20 are the horizontal and vertical positioning
error thresholds of UAVs. In addition, V maxd = 15 m/s is
the maximum speed of the mobile user, V maxu,h = 20 m/s and
V maxu,v = 20/
√
2 m/s, u ∈ {s, j}, are the maximum horizontal
and vertical speed of the UAV-S and UAV-J, hmin = 20 m
and hmax = 120 m are the minimum and maximum UAVs
flight altitudes, respectively [27], [29], [32].
Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) depict the projections of the tra-
jectories of the UAVs onto the horizontal plane and the 3D
plane during different time durations T , respectively. The
initial location of the mobile user D is marked by ∗ and
the exact locations of the eavesdroppers En are marked by
×. △ and ▽ denote the initial and final positions of the
UAV-S and UAV-J, respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 2(a),
when T is small (e.g., T = 21 s), both UAV-S (solid curves)
and UAV-J (dashed curves) almost directly fly to the final
location, since the minimum flight time T is required to fly
from the initial location to the final location. As T increases,
the UAV-S first flies in an arc path to keep away from the
eavesdropper E1, then it follows the mobile user as long as
possible, and finally flies to the final location along an arc
path bypassing the eavesdropper E2. Meanwhile, the UAV-J
first exploits its mobility to move closer to the eavesdroppers,
then it hovers over the center of the estimated locations of the
eavesdroppers as long as possible, and finally flies quickly to
the final location. The reason behind this behavior is that UAV-
S needs to follow the mobile user to harvest sufficient energy
and transmit more information while UAV-J moves closer
to the eavesdroppers to get the best position for jamming
accordingly.
In Fig. 2(b), for all given values of T , both UAV-S and
UAV-J first fly to a lower altitude, then they cruise at the
altitude for a certain period of time, and subsequently climbs
up until reaching the final location. The reason is that the
UAVs reduce the altitude to simultaneously come closer to the
mobile user and the eavesdroppers, which leads to a smaller
path loss between the UAV-S and the mobile user as well as a
larger AN jamming between the UAV-J and the eavesdroppers,
and thereby improves the system secrecy rate performance.
Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) plot the projections of the trajectories
of the UAVs with the following four schemes, respectively:
1) The proposed robust 3D joint optimization (3D-joint.opt),
i.e., ∆Q1 = ∆Q2 = 20 m; 2) The worst-robust 3D joint
optimization (WRob-3D-joint.opt), i.e., ∆Q1 = 100 m and
∆Q2 = 20 m; 3) The robust 2D joint optimization (2D-
joint.opt), i.e., ∆Q1 = ∆Q2 = 20 m and hu = 100
m, u ∈ {s, j}; 4) The worst-robust 2D joint optimization
(WRob-2D-joint.opt), i.e., ∆Q1 = 100 m and hu = 100
m. From the simulation results illustrated in Fig. 3(a), when
∆Q1 = ∆Q2 = 20 m, the proposed 3D-joint.opt and 2D-
joint.opt schemes yield similar aerial trajectories which is
similar to Fig. 2(a). However, when the estimation error ∆Q1
is sufficiently large, i.e., ∆Q1 = 100 m, the UAV-J in WRob-






























































Fig. 2. Optimized UAVs trajectories during different time durations T : (a)
Horizontal plane; (b) 3D plane .
3D-joint.opt and WRob-2D-joint.opt schemes hover over the
left of the center location of the eavesdroppers for a longer
time duration compared to the above 3D-joint.opt and 2D-
joint.opt schemes. The reason behind this behavior is that the
eavesdropper E1 can be closer to the mobile user with the
increasing estimation error, and thus, the UAV-J is required
to fly to the possible center location of the eavesdroppers to
effectively transmit AN.
As in Fig. 2(b), similar 3D trajectories can be observed in
Fig. 3(b). Nevertheless, different to the 2D schemes with the
fixed flight altitude, both UAV-S and UAV-J in the proposed
10



























































D's trajectory ∆ Q1=100 m
(b)
Fig. 3. Optimized UAVs trajectory of different algorithms with T = 30 s :
(a) Horizontal plane; (b) 3D plane .
3D schemes can flexibly adjust their heights to obtain a
better system performance, which is discussed in the following
simulations.
Fig. 4 compares the performance of our proposed robust 3D
joint design with that of the other four benchmark schemes
with different flight time slots N , where a fixed TS ratio
scheme (NTS-joint.opt) is considered, i.e., α[n] = 0.5. As
can be seen in Fig. 4, the average secrecy rate of all schemes
first increases and then decreases slowly as the number of the
flight time slots N increases. This is because when N is small,
increasing the flight time slots would result in a higher SINR






















Fig. 4. Achieved average secrecy rates of different algorithms versus N .
at the mobile user and a lower SINR at the eavesdroppers
due to the UAVs position closer to them. However, when N
is large enough, the mobile user moves closer to the location
of the eavesdroppers, which results in more information
intercepted at the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, as expected,
the proposed robust 3D algorithm achieves a superior per-
formance compared to that of the 2D-joint.opt and NTS-
joint.opt schemes. The reason for this superior performance is
that the proposed 3D joint design can effectively exploit the
available more degrees of freedom of the UAV’s horizontal
and vertical locations as well as the TS ratio. Furthermore,
when the estimation error ∆Q1 is large, it is obvious that the
achievable average secrecy rate performance of the WRob-3D-
joint.opt and WRob-2D-joint.opt schemes is worse than that
of the 3D-joint.opt and 2D-joint.opt schemes, respectively.
This is because the uncertainty of eavesdroppers’ locations is
larger for a larger ∆Qk, and the trajectory design and resource
allocation, in turn, would be more conservative; this leads to
a less efficient utilization of the system resources.
Next, we show the achievable average secrecy rates of
the aforementioned five schemes versus different transmit
power Ps[n] = Pj [n] with N = 30. From the simulation
results illustrated in Fig. 5, as expected, the achievable average
secrecy rate of all schemes increases as the transmit power at
UAV-S and UAV-J increases. The reason behind this behavior
is that increasing the transmit power Ps[n] = Pj [n] can
improve the instantaneous SINRd at the user and simul-
taneously deteriorate the corresponding SINRe quickly at
the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, as can be seen in Fig. 5,
the proposed robust 3D algorithm always shows significant
performance gain over the other four benchmark schemes for
any given value of Ps[n] = Pj [n], which has been previously
explained in detail.
In Fig. 6, we investigate the convergence of the proposed
algorithm and the four benchmark algorithms with N = 30.
As can be seen in Fig. 6, the achievable average secrecy rates
of all algorithms first increase with the number of iterations in
11
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Fig. 5. Achieved average secrecy rates of different algorithms versus
Ps[n] = Pj [n].






















Fig. 6. Convergence of different algorithms.
Table II, and then converge to a constant secrecy rate within
a few iterations. In addition, it is also observed that the speed
of convergence of the proposed 3D scheme is similar to that
of the other benchmark schemes. Furthermore, from Fig. 6,
it is noticed that the proposed algorithm converges within 20
iterations on average.
Fig. 7 illustrates the TS resource profile of UAVs versus
different flight time N and EH threshold Eu, u ∈ {s, j}.
As shown in Fig. 7, when Eu is small, i.e., Es = Ej = 0
J, the UAVs remain with the TS ratio α = 1 for different N
values. This implies that all time slots are used for information
transmission. As Eu increases, i.e., Es = Ej = 20 J and
Es = Ej = 40 J, both UAV-S and UAV-J reduce the TS
ratio to zero for a certain period of time such that sufficient
energy can be harvested. Thus, the UAVs need to design the
optimal TS resource profile in an energy-constrained system
to achieve the best system performance. In addition, as can
be seen in Fig. 7, when the EH requirement at the UAVs is












































Fig. 7. TS resource profile of different EH thresholds versus N .
































































Fig. 8. Flight velocity of UAVs with different time durations against N .
large enough, i.e., Es = Ej = 60 J, the UAVs will keep the
TS ratio α = 0 unchanged as N increases. This is because
both UAV-S and UAV-J need to harvest energy among all time
slots to meet the EH requirements.
Finally, we present the UAVs’ horizontal and vertical veloc-
ity, Vu,h and Vu,v , u ∈ {s, j}, versus different time durations
N , respectively. As shown in Fig. 8 (top left), when T is small,
i.e., T = 21 s, the UAV-S flies to the final location with the
maximum horizontal speed V maxs,h = 20 m/s. However, when
T is large (e.g., T = 30 and T = 40 s), the UAV-S first flies at
its maximum horizontal speed to get closer to the mobile user.
Then, it reduces the horizontal speed to 15 m/s to follow the
user (V maxd = 15 m/s) as long as possible, and finally flies to
the final location with maximum horizontal speed. From Fig.
8 (top right), for all considered T values, the UAV-S quickly
reduces the vertical speed to 0 and then cruises at the vertical
speed before reaching the final location. This is because a
large vertical speed may lead to a large vertical displacement
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which causes a large path loss of the communication links and
a degradation of the system performance. Furthermore, as can
be seen in Fig. 8 (bottom left), the UAV-J first flies with the
maximum horizontal speed and then reduces the horizontal
speed to a lower value until reaches the final location as N
increases. The reason behind this behavior is that the UAV-J
needs to find its optimum position quickly and then hovers at
that position near the eavesdroppers as long as possible for
jamming purpose. In addition, from Fig. 8 (bottom right), the
UAV-J follows a vertical speed policy during all time slots N
similar to that of the UAV-S. This is because that the UAV-
J can cruise at lowest altitude with vertical speed Vj,v = 0
m/s, which results in a more effective AN jamming to the
eavesdroppers.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the jointly optimal 3D-
trajectory and TS allocation design for energy-constrained
dual-UAV-assisted secure communication systems with imper-
fect eavesdropper locations. We have formulated an optimiza-
tion problem to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate from
the UAVs to the mobile user among all time slots under the
UAV’s mobility, anti-collision, positioning and EH constraints.
Different from the most previous works which use the free
space path loss model to simplify the analysis, we have
adopted a typical UAV-ocean channel model with both large-
scale and small-scale fading components. In order to deal
with the non-convexity issue, we have first decomposed the
original optimization problem into three subproblems and then
transformed them into more tractable forms. Finally, we have
developed an iterative algorithm to determine a suboptimal
solution of the considered problem. Furthermore, we have
analyzed the convergence and the impact of different parame-
ters of the proposed algorithm. The simulation results have
demonstrated that the proposed 3D dual-UAV joint design
can achieve a significant improvement in average secrecy rate
compared to conventional 2D UAV-aided schemes.
APPENDIX A
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTRAINT (23b)




k[n]−∆Q2k ≤ 0, ∀k, (35a)
−(xs[n]−xek[n]−∆xk[n])2−(ys[n]−yek[n]−∆yk[n])2
− h2s[n] + t2[n] ≤ 0, ∀k.
(35b)
By exploiting the S-Procedure [23], [46], [47], the constraint
(23b) can be rewritten as follows:
Φ(xs[n], ys[n], hs[n], t2[n], ξk[n]) ≽ 0, ∀k, n, (36)
where Φ(xs[n], ys[n], hs[n], t2[n], ξk[n]) =

ξk[n] + 1 0 xek [n]− xs[n]
0 ξk[n] + 1 yek [n]− ys[n]
xek [n]− xs[n] yek [n]− ys[n] −∆Q2kξk[n] + ck[n]

,
and ck[n] = x
2
s[n] − 2xek [n]xs[n] + x2ek [n] + y2s [n] −
2yek [n]ys[n] + y
2
ek
[n] + h2s[n]− t2[n]. Since the terms x2s[n],
y2s [n] and h
2
s[n] contained in ck[n] are non-linear, by using
the first-order Taylor series expansions of them, we have
x2s[n] ≥ −x2sfea [n] + 2xsfea [n]xs[n],
y2s [n] ≥ −y2sfea [n] + 2ysfea [n]ys[n],
h2s[n] ≥ −h2sfea [n] + 2hsfea [n]hs[n],
(37)
where xsfea , [xsfea [1], xsfea [2], ..., xsfea [N ]]
†,
ysfea , [ysfea [1], ysfea [2], ..., ysfea [N ]]
†, and
hsfea , [hsfea [1], hsfea [2], ..., hsfea [N ]]
†. Thus, the
constraint (36) can be equivalently converted as
Φ̃(xs[n], ys[n], hs[n], t2[n], ξk[n]) ≽ 0, ∀k, n, (38)
where Φ̃(xs[n], ys[n], hs[n], t2[n], ξk[n]) =

ξk[n] + 1 0 xek [n]− xs[n]
0 ξk[n] + 1 yek [n]− ys[n]
xek [n]− xs[n] yek [n]− ys[n] −∆Q2kξk[n] + c̃k[n]

,
and c̃k[n] = −x2sfea [n] + 2xsfea [n]xs[n] − 2xek [n]xs[n] +
x2ek [n]− y2sfea [n] + 2ysfea [n]ys[n]− 2yek [n]ys[n] + yek [n]2−
h2sfea [n] + 2hsfea [n]hs[n]− t2[n]. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
THE CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
ALGORITHM IN TABLE II
Suppose Ψ{αl−1,ul−1s ,ul−1j } denotes the objective value
















First, in step 5 of Table II, since the optimal solution of
problem in (20) is obtained for given ul−1s and u
l−1
j , we have
Ψ{αl−1,ul−1s ,ul−1j } ≤ Ψ{αl,ul−1s ,ul−1j }, (39)
where Ψ{αl,ul−1s ,ul−1j } denotes the computed objective
value of problem in (20). Second, for given αl and ul−1j in
step 6 of Table II, it follows that
Ψ{αl,ul−1s ,ul−1j }
(a)
= Ψlbs {αl,ul−1s ,ul−1j }
(b)




where Ψlbs represents the objective value of problem in (27),
(a) is due to the tightness of the first-order Taylor series
expansions at local points in the problem in (27), (b) holds
since the problem in (27) is solved optimally for given αl and
ul−1j , and (c) holds due to the fact that the optimal objective
value of problem in (27) is the lower bound of that of the
problem in (22). Similarly, for given αl and uls in step 7 of
Table II, we have
Ψ{αl,uls,ul−1j }
(d)







Thus, combing (39)−(41), we can obtain that
Ψ{αl−1,ul−1s ,ul−1j } ≤ Ψ{αl,uls,ulj}, (42)
which guarantees that the objective value of the problem in
(13) is non-decreasing over the iterations. Thus, the solution
obtained by the iterative algorithm in Table II can be guaran-
teed to converge to a suboptimal solution. This completes the
proof.
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